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      Issue 
Has Rhoton failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his unified sentence of 12 years, with five 




Rhoton Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 In November 2012, the state charged Rhoton with two counts of burglary, two 
counts of grand theft, and one count of malicious injury to property.  (R., pp.88-90.)  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rhoton pled guilty to an amended charge of grand theft 
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by possession of stolen property and agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of his 
codefendants, the state dismissed the remaining charges and agreed not to prosecute 
any related charges, and the parties stipulated to “a period of probation with the length 
and terms of probation in the discretion of the court.”  (R., pp.111-12, 121-24.)  As part 
of the plea agreement, Rhoton waived his right to appeal his sentence, but reserved his 
right to appeal “any subsequent decision of the court relative to relinquishment of 
jurisdiction, revocation of probation or motions for reduction of sentence pursuant to 
I.C.R. 35.”  (R., p.124.)  The district court accepted the plea agreement and imposed a 
unified sentence of 12 years, with five years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed 
Rhoton on supervised probation for five years.  (R., pp.125-33; Tr., p.39, Ls.14-15.)   
 Three months later, Rhoton’s probation officer filed a report of violation alleging 
that Rhoton had violated the conditions of his probation by changing residences without 
permission, failing to report for supervision as instructed, failing to obtain employment, 
and absconding supervision.  (R., pp.137-39.)  Pursuant to an agreement with the state, 
Rhoton admitted the allegations and the state agreed to recommend the retained 
jurisdiction program.  (R., pp.164-65.)  The district court revoked Rhoton’s probation, 
ordered the underlying sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.167-69.)  
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, on February 24, 2014, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp.184-86.)   
Exactly 120 days later, on June 24, 2014, Rhoton filed a Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence.  (R., pp.187-89.)  A hearing on the motion was held 76 days 
later, on September 8, 2014, and, on September 10, 2014 – 198 days after the entry of 
its order relinquishing jurisdiction, the district court entered an order denying Rhoton’s 
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Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.211-14.)  Approximately 16 months later, pursuant to an order 
partially granting post-conviction relief, the district court entered an order re-entering the 
order denying Rhoton’s Rule 35 motion, “effective” January 6, 2016.  (R., pp.224-25.)  
On January 21, 2016, Rhoton filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.240-43.)   
Rhoton asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence in light of his cooperation in the prosecution of his 
codefendants, his claim that he was not an active participant in the original offenses, his 
acknowledgement that he has a drug addiction and his participation in treatment 
therefor, his purported acceptance of responsibility, and his desire to be eligible for the 
community work center program sooner.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)  Rhoton has failed 
to establish an abuse of discretion.   
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho 
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a 
sentence.”  The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
 Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence 
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, 
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review 
the underlying sentence.”  Id.  Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 
442 (2008).   
Rhoton waived his right to appeal his sentence, and he did not appeal the order 
relinquishing jurisdiction in this case.  Furthermore, he provided no new information in 
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support of his Rule 35 motion.  The district court was aware, at the time of sentencing 
and/or at the time that it relinquished jurisdiction, that Rhoton had cooperated in the 
prosecution of his codefendants as part of his plea agreement (R., pp.122-23; PSI, p.4; 
Tr., p.14, L.19 – p.16, L.16; p.35, Ls.3-19; p.42, L.20 – p.45, L.16; p.78, Ls.13-16; p.96, 
L.21 – p.97, L.11; p.108, Ls.5-15; p.109, Ls.8-11), that he claimed he was not an active 
participant in the original crimes (PSI, p.5), that he had a substance abuse problem and 
had participated in treatment (PSI, pp.17-18; APSI, p.1; Tr., p.108, Ls.7-8; p.113, Ls.9-
12; p.119, L.16 – p.120, L.11), and of his purported acceptance of responsibility (PSI, 
p.5; Tr., p.85, Ls.16-18; p.110, Ls.4-7).  That Rhoton wanted to be eligible sooner for 
the community work center program was not “new” information, nor is it “new” 
information that prisoners are most often placed in such programs nearer to their date of 
parole eligibility.  As the district court noted in its order denying Rhoton’s Rule 35 
motion, “The IDOC rules for determining who is eligible for a community work program 
is not something this court has any authority over.”  (R., p.213.)  Because Rhoton 
presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in 
the motion that his sentence was excessive.  Having failed to make such a showing, he 
has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule 
35 motion.   
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Rhoton’s claim, Rhoton has still failed 
to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the district court’s 
Order Denying Motion Pursuant to ICR 35, which the state adopts as its argument on 
appeal.  (Appendix A.)   
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Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Rhoton’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
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Case No. CR 2012-5367f) 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
PURSUANT TO ICR 35 
The defendant previously pled guilty to: Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen 
Property, a felony, in violation ofidaho Code §18-2403(4) and 18-2407(l)(b)(1). 
The defendant was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of 
Correction for twelve (l 2) years, consisting of a minilmun period of confinement of five 
(5) years, during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or 
cre<lit or reduction of sentence for good conduct (except as provided by Idoho Code 
section 20-10 ID), and an indeterminate period of confinement not exceeding seven (7) 
years. 
The sentence to confinement with the Idaho Depat1ment of Col'l'ection was 
suspended and the defendant placed on st1pervised felony supervision for five (5) years. 
The state alleged that the defendant violated his probation. The defendant 
admitted that he violated his probation by changing his residence without prior approval 
of his probation officer; by failing to engage in treatment ordered by his probation 
officer; by failing to seek and maintain employment; and by avoiding supervision. 






At a jurisrlictional review hcarine after the dcfcnc:lant had completed his "rider" 
the cou11 relinquished jurisdiction because the defendant did not complete programing 
during his "rider", continued to maintain a pattern of criminal thinking; and failed to take 
responsibility for his substance abuse. The defendant's perfornumce during his "rider" 
was unsatisfactory and the IDOC recommended that the court relinquish jurisdiction. 
The defondanl's cunent motion is pursuant to ICR 35 and he is requesting that at 
least the determinate portion of his sentence be reduced because he cooperated with the 
st!lte in obtaining convictions of others involved in the same crimes as the c:lcfcnc:lant, anc:1 
because the defendant is now doing well in prison and would like to be eligible to be 
considered for a community work program lluough tht: 1DOC. Tht: !DOC rules for 
determjning who is eligible for a community work program is not something this court 
has any authority over. 
As to the sentence originally imposed by the court, the court detem1ined, and still 
finds, that the sentence was appropriate for the crime(s) committed and the defendant's 
criminal record. The defendant had the opportunity to con·ect his behavior through 
probation and a "rider", but failed to demonstrate during those programs that he was 
making progress towards rehabilitation, and was not a danger to reoffend. 
The court declines to manipulate the original sentence to avoid IDOC rules. 
The defendant's motion is denied. 
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